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CHOICE OF LAW: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S SUIT TO
COLLECT LOAN GRANTED BY FEDERAL AGENCY
DEFEATED BY STATE LAW DEFENSE OF COVERTURE
UNDER THE Erie doctrine federal courts are required to apply state
law to determine the outcome of litigation where the matter in-
volved is not expressly governed by the federal constitution or acts
of Congress.1 In suits where the United States is a party to a com-
mercial instrument, however, the exercise of a constitutional func-
tion or power may often render Erie inapplicable in determining the
Government's rights and duties.2 If a federal rule is thus required,
state law cannot control unless incorporated as an appropriate source
of federal common law. Without articulating the basis for its choice
of law, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Yazell 3 held that a Texas
law invalidating most married women's contracts was a valid defense
to a deficiency judgment on a loan executed to the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
In Yazell, the defendant and her husband (trading as a partner-
ship) had signed a promissory note to repay money borrowed as
a disaster loan from the SBA.4 After default by the husband and
defendant, the federal government foreclosed on a chattel mortgage
and subsequently sued for a deficiency judgment against both
IErie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
187-218 (1963); Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence
of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE UJ. 267 (1946).
Some courts have limited the application of Erie to diversity cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); .American Textile Mach. Corp. v. United States, 220 F.2d
584, 587 (6th Cir. 1955); Sands v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 880, 883 (W.D. Wash.
1960), aff'd sub nom., 295 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1961). Contra, IA MOORE, FEDERAL
P.AarlcE 0.305[3]. at 3052-57 (1961) (the law to be applied is keyed to the nature of
the issue rather than the jurisdictional basis). For non-diversity cases in which Erie
was applied, see cases cited id. at 3055 n.7. For the application of federal law in a
diversity case, see American Pipe & Steel Corp. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 292 F.2d
640, 644 (9th Cir. 1961).
2Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See generally Dum-
bauld, The Clear Field of Clearfield, 61 DICK. L. REv. 299 (1957); 53 COLUM. L. Rxv.
991 (1953).
'334 F.2d 454 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. granted, 85 S. Ct. 651 (1965) (No. 575).
'Id. at 456.
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obligors. Although the federal district court entered a judgment
against the husband, it held that under Texas law a contract to
which a married woman is a party is unenforceable as to her separate
property. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed on
the ground that one incapable of making a contract cannot be held
liable merely because the United States was a party to the instru-
ment.6
After Erie announced that there was no federal general common
law,7 the federal courts applied state law in cases where the federal
government was a party to a commercial instrument.8 In Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States,9 however, the Supreme Court decided
that Erie was inapplicable in determining the rights and duties of
the United States on a forged government check, because the au-
thority to issue such checks was derived from "the Constitution and
the statutes of the United States."'1 The Court reasoned that appli-
cation of state law would subject the Government's legal rights to
"exceptional uncertainty,"" and would render identical transactions
subject to the "vagaries of the laws of the several states."'1  Thus
there emerged an area of "federal common law"' 3 pursuant to the
Clearfield mandate that "in absence of an applicable Act of Congress
it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards."'14 In cases involving government
contracts,15 government issue of commercial paper,'6 and execution
5 See 13 VERNON's ANN. CIv. ST. art. 4623 (1960). The article has since been re-
pealed. Acts 1963, ch. 472 § 4.
' The dissenting judge contended that the defense of coverture should not have
been allowed, for "a loan from the Federal Government is a federal matter and should
be governed by federal law.... This is the clear holding of [Clearfield]." 334 F.2d at
456. He did not indicate from what source the federal law abrogating coverture
would be derived, but argued that "the federal rule ought to be that you must repay
what you borrow." Ibid.
S304 U.S. at 78.
' See, e.g., Alameda County v. United States, 124 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1941) (contract);
United States v. Brookridge Farm, Inc., 111 F.2d 461 (10th Cir. 1940) (contract); Live
Stock Nat'l Bank v. United States, 106 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1939) (insurance policy);
Security-First Nat'1 Bank v. United States, 103 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1939) (government
check); Keifer & Keifer v. RFC, 97 F.2d 812 (8th Cir. 1938) (contract). See Pofcher,
The Choice of Law, State or Federal, in Cases Involving Government Contracts, 12 LA.
L. R v. 37, 38-42 (1951); 40 CORNELL L.Q. 561, 566 (1955).
'318 U.S. 363 (1943).
10 Id. at 366.
1 Id. at 367.
12 Ibid.
"United States 6 Standard Oil Co.. 332 U.S. 301 308 (1947).
"318 U.S. at 367.
"E.g., Priebe & Sons v. L nited States. 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v. Standard
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of commercial instruments to the government, 17 the rights and
liabilities of the United States acting on its own behalf or through
one of its agencies has often been determined by federal common law
if there is no controlling act of Congress.
In determining whether federal law should apply to these cases,
the courts have considered the following criteria: whether the activ-
ity of the Government was authorized by a Constitutional function
or power; 8 the existence of relevant federal statutes;' 9 and the
presence of a sufficient federal interest.20  In these instances, Erie
has no effect on matters which vitally affect the interests, powers
and relations of the United States requiring uniform national dis-
position.2 1 Once federal law is deemed controlling, the courts may
refer to several sources to determine the appropriate federal rule,
22
including federal case law,23 the Negotiable Instruments Law,24 the
Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106 (1944); United States v. County of Allegheny, 822 U.S. 174
(1944); United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v. Chester
Park Apartments, Inc., 332 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1964); Reimann v. United States, 315 F.2d
746 (9th Cir. 1963); Krupp v. Federal Housing Administration, 285 F.2d 833 (Ist Cir.
1961); American Houses, Inc. v. Schneider, 211 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1954).
Even before Clearfield, federal law was held applicable in a few government
contract cases for this reason. See Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 313 U.S.
289, 296 (1941) (federal right is not dependent on state remedy); Byron Jackson Co. v.
United States, 35 F. Supp. 665 (S.D. Cal. 1940). See generally Pofcher, supra note 8.
"'
8 E.g., National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); Clearfield
Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Fulton Nat'l Bank v. United States,
197 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1952); Continental-American Bank & Trust Co. v. United States,
161 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 870 (1949). See generally
Comment, 6 VILL. L. REV. 388 (1961).
17E.g., United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963); Hendry v. United States,
305 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1962); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.
1950); W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Va. 1962). See
generally Comment, 6 VILL. L. REv. 388 (1961).
1 United States v. County of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 182 (1944); Clearfield Trust
Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943); United States v. McCabe, 261 F.2d 539,
543 (8th Cir. 1958); Sands v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 880, 882 (W.D. Wash. 1960),
aff'd sub nom. 295 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. United States Foreign
Corp., 151 F. Supp. 658, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); FDIC v. Rectenwall, 97 F. Supp. 273, 274
(N.D. Ind. 1951).
19 United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 878,
885 (W.D. Va. 1962). See also Mitchell v. Flintkote Co., 185 F.2d 1008, 1011 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 341 U.S. 931 (1951) (executive order).
20 United States v. Taylor, 333 F.2d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 714 (3d Cir. 1963); American Houses, Inc. v. Schneider, 211
F.2d 881, 883 (3d Cir. 1954).
21 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 307 (1947).
22 See 46 MINN. L. REY. 975, 980-81 (1962).
28 E.g., National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945);
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S 363. 367 (1943): United States v.
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Uniform Sales Act," 5 and Restatements..2 6  Provisions of state law
may also be adopted or incorporated as the federal rule when con-
sidered adequate to accomplish the required federal policy or when
consistent with adequate protection of the federal interest.2 7
Since the United States was suing to enforce a promissory note
to which it was a party, the result in Yazell can only be justified as
either: (1) the application of Erie due to the absence of a sufficient
federal interest or policy;28 or (2) the incorporation of Texas law as
the appropriate federal rule.
Although the Fifth Circuit distinguished Clearfield on its facts, 29
Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir. 1963); United States v. Matthews, 244 F.2d 626
(9th Cir. 1957); Girard Trust Co. v. United States, 149 F.2d 872, 874 (3d Cir. 1945);
Boy v. United States, 179 F. Supp. 67, 69 (M.D.N.C. 1959). The courts frequently
refer to general contract law. E.g., Priebe &: Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411
(1947) (liquidated damages); United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111
(1944) (revision of contract); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp.,
141 F. Supp. 833, 837 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961) (indemnifica-
tion agreement in construction contract).
2'E.g., Hendry v. United States, 305 F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1962) (methods for
discharge of negotiable instrument); New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. RFC, 180 F.2d 241,
244 (2d Cir. 1950) (legal effect of offer to reduce interest on notes).
25 See Whitin Mach. Works v. United States, 175 F.2d 504, 507 (Ist Cir. 1949)
(implied warranty under contract for sale of goods).
20 See United States v. Le Roy Dyal Co., 186 F.2d 460, 461 (3d Cir. 1950) (RvsTATE-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 339 (1932) (liquidated damages).
27 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943); United States v.
Union Live Stock Sales Co., 298 F.2d 755, 758 (4th Cir. 1962); Bumb v. United States,
276 F.2d 729, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1960); cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S.
301, 308-10 (1947), where it was suggested that state law might be incorporated in the
following types of cases: (1) when the Government purchases real estate from one
whose title to the property is invalidated by state law; (2) when it appears that
Congress has consented to the application of state law; and (3) when state law may
furnish "convenient solutions" not inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal
interest. The court indicated that relevant considerations include: federal supremacy
in the performance of federal functions; the need for uniformity; and inferences to
be drawn from the silence of Congress.
28 For cases in which federal law was rejected see RFC v. Breeding, 211 F.2d 385
(10th Cir. 1954) (action by federal corporation held not comparable to suit by United
States as a sovereign); United States v. Covington Independent Tobacco Warehouse
Co., 152 F. Supp. 612, 614 (E.D. Ky. 1957) (court considered itself bound to apply
state law under the Erie doctrine); see Werfel v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 507 (S.D.N.Y.
1948) (state law applied because contract executed in state); cf. United States v. Bryant,
58 F. Supp. 663 (S.D. Fla. 1945), aff'd, 157 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1946) (application of
state law was favorable to the government).
In some cases federal law is held to govern one issue, state law held to govern
another. Bank of America v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956) (state law governed the
quc!tion of "good faith," federal law governed the question of whether the bonds
were overdue); Continental Cas. Co. v. Schaefer, 173 F.2d 5 (9th Cir. 1949). See gen-
erally Comment, 6 VIL. L. REv. 388 (1961); 45 CALIF. L. Rav. 212 (1957); 18 U. Pitt.
L. RE% 820 (1957).
28 334 F.2d at 455. The court held that this was not like those cases "of federal
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the theory of that decision has been extended to other factual
settings 0 including those where the United States sues to enforce a
promissory note executed to a federal agency.3 1 The disaster loans
which the SBA administers to small business constitute the exercise
of a function authorized by the Constitution and federal statutes.32
In Bumb v. United States,33 the Ninth Circuit held that this authori-
zation alone was sufficient to require the application of federal
common law in determining the validity of chattel mortgages exe-
cuted to the SBA.
Similarly, in a suit to foreclose mortgages insured by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA), the Sixth Circuit in United States
v. Helz 4 also found federal law to be applicable because that agency's
lending activity was authorized by statute. That decision, however,
went beyond the analysis offered in Bumb and evaluated the federal
interest in preserving the money and credit of the Government, and
the policy of protecting federal investments to facilitate the building
of homes. Since the FHA and SBA both operate through local
offices for the benefit of financially distressed citizens, the success of
both programs requires that the United States be able to collect
loans and protect its investments. The only major difference be-
tween the two agencies is the ultimate use of their loans, thus, the
interest and policy of the Government in enforcing repayment of
FHA loans would seem to apply to the SBA as well. In light of the
constitutional and statutory authorization for lending activities, the
policy of aiding small business, and the federal interest in collection,
the better view would appear to be that Yazell is not a proper case
for the Erie requirement of state law.
The result reached by the Fifth Circuit, therefore, is justifiable
only if Texas law of coverture can be incorporated as an appropriate
commercial paper issued by and as an obligation of the United States," but was merely
a simple case of whether a married woman could be held liable on a contract which
"she was incapable of making."
so See cases cited notes 15 and 17 supra.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Hel, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963) (note originally
executed to a bank, but subsequently acquired by the FHA, which succeeded to the
bank's rights); Hendry v. United States, 305 F.2d 515 (9th Cir. 1962).
82 Disaster loans are authorized by an amendment to the Small Business Act of
1953. 69 Stat. 549 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1958). The underlying constitutional
authority appears to rest on the commerce clause. See Small Business Act of 1953 §
202, 67 Stat. 232, 15 U.S.C. § 631 (1958).
as 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960).31314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963).
[Vol. 1965: 886
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source for determining the federal rule. In deciding whether state
law should be adopted instead of an independent federal rule,3 some
lower federal courts have balanced the state and federal interests3 6
Thus they have evaluated the federal interest in uniform rights and
duties and effective remedies to protect the security of federal invest-
ments, as against state procedural safeguards and policy.
Generally, local law is deemed inconsistent with the appropriate
federal rule when it frustrates the remedies of the Government 7 as
opposed to merely stipulating procedures to be followed in effectuat-
ing a valid transaction.38 In Bumb, therefore, the local recording
statute was applied because it did not purport to preclude the
Government's remedy in foreclosing a validly created security in-
terest. The requirement of filing notice for the benefit of other
creditors did not inhibit the Government's right to require security
for its loans. In Helz, however, state law of coverture was rejected 9
as a valid defense because it prohibited any recovery on a note
executed by the defendant. Arguably, the Texas law in Yazell was
merely a procedure and not frustration of a remedy because a mar-
35 In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947), the Court stated
that state law may be applied when Congress has so consented. In Bumb v. United
States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960), the court found no congressional intent to exempt
requirements for SBA loans from local law. Id. at 736.
so See United States v. View Crest Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959), where the court stated, "A court confronted with [the
question of redemption, for example] ... could determine it by weighing the federal
interest against the particular local policy involved. If the considerations weighed
by the court suggest an adoption of local law, such as the local rule on redemption,
that could be done. But if on the other hand necessity requires the fashioning of a
federal rule, absent a declared federal rule on the subject the federal courts are
authorized to and capable of fashioning one." Id. at 383. See Bumb v. United States,
note 35 supra; WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 216-17 (1963); Mishkin, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence & Discretion in the Choice of National & State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. PA. L. t-Ev. 797, 810-14 (1957).
17 United States v. Helz, 314 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1963). In United States v. View
Crest Garden Apts., Inc., note 36 supra, the court stressed that when remedies
are involved the federal policy to protect the Treasury and to promote the security of
federal investment is paramount.
88 Bumb v. United States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v. View Crest
Garden Apts., Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959)
(dictum).
31 The defendant and her husband had executed two notes to a banking institution
to secure a loan for improvements on their home. Prior to the making of the loan,
they had provided for FHA payment insurance under the National Housing Act. After
a default, the notes were assigned to the United States on behalf of the FHA. Since
the husband had been discharged in bankruptcy, the United States sought to recover
from the wife. 314 F.2d at 302. [he court fashioned an independent federal rule
which disallowed the common law defense of coverture in Michigan and provided for
enforcement of the obligation. Id. at 303.
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tied woman was enabled by statute to waive the contractual dis-
ability afforded by coverture. 40 Thus, the federal government could
have collected its loans by requiring the defendant to waive her pro-
tection. Nonetheless, the Fifth Circuit relied upon another theory
by asserting that the defendant's disability invalidated her contrac-
tual liability from its inception, in the same manner accorded con-
tracts of a person of minor age or unsound mind. Under this
rationale, the remedy-procedure dichotomy is not presented because
a legal obligation was never incurred.
This analogy to the law governing persons of minor age or un-
sound mind, however, fails to satisfy the federal interest in uniform
rules governing the disposition of federal rights and duties on com-
mercial instruments.41 Uniformity facilitates the effective admin-
istration of federal loans by obviating the necessity of tailoring loan
programs to the law and policy of each state. A fundamental dis-
tinction between the recording requirement in Bumb, the disability
of minors and persons of unsound mind on the one hand, and the
Texas law of coverture on the other, is that the former represent
policies to which all states adhere;42 the disability of married women
is an archaic common law concept remaining only in a few states.
43
Since the SBA is involved in the extension of credit on a nationwide
40 Under Texas law any married woman could have applied by written request to a
district court for an order removing her disability. If it appeared to the court that
waiver would have been to the applicant's advantage, the court could have entered its
decree declaring her capable of contracting for mercantile or trading purposes. 18
VERNON's ANN. Civ. ST. art. 4626 (1960). The provision has since been amended, Acts
1963, ch. 472 § 6, and the repeal of article 4623 has rendered article 4626 nugatory.
See note 5 supra.
,2 See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); United States
r. Sommerville, 324 F.2d 712 (3d Cir. 1963); Sands v. United States, 198 F. Supp. 880
(W.D. Wash. 1960), aff'd sub nom. First Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
295 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1961); Guy F. Atkinson Co. v. Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp.,
141 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd, 295 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1961). The dissenter in
Yazell stated that uniform application of the Small Business Act was necessary to
insure the repayment of large sums of money. He contended that the general applica-
tion of local rules as to contractual capacity would result in "chaos which would
nullify federal programs for disaster relief. 334 F.2d at 456. Furthermore, he
argued that the decision of the majority could not be limited to the Small Business
kct, but would frustrate a multitude of other federal programs. Ibid.
2In Bumb the court noted the general enactment of laws requiring notice of
intent to mortgage and stated that no hardship would be imposed on the SBA under
such a rule, "in the light of the fact the policy of all states of the Union is to give to
such creditors some modicum of protection." 276 F.2d at 738.
s See 26 Am. Jim. Husband &' Wife § 20 (1940), which states that the disability of a
wife to act and contract as a legal person has been removed in practically all states.
[Vol. 1965: 386
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basis, this type of variant law is a prime example of the evil which
has necessitated the application of uniform federal rules.
Nevertheless, there are compelling reasons for asserting that the
federal interest in uniformity is inconsistent with the adninistration
of loans by the SBA. As the Ninth Circuit recognized in Bumb,
this agency operates on a local basis with local personnel who should
be aware of laws of the state in which they work.44  Since the admin-
istration of such loans involves many contractual and property ques-
tions governed by state law, the agency would not be overburdened
by recognizing the Texas policy supporting coverture. 45 Further-
more, alert SBA officials could have easily required the defendant in
Yazell to waive her contractual disability as a condition to the loan.4
Aside from these factors, the application of a well-established body
of local law would also provide the prospective borrower with a
greater degree of certainty as to his individual rights and obligations.
An independent federal rule drawn from disparate sources of la 4 7
leaves both parties in doubt; many sources of law would have to be
checked to insure the protection for which each party bargains.
Much of the confusion reflected in the Yazell, Bumb and Helz
decisions could be eliminated if Congress adopted the Uniform Com-
mercial Code as the exclusive source of federal law.48 In those
"1 In Bumb the court stated that although the SBA operates throughout the United
States "such fact raises no presumption of the desirability of a uniform federal rule
with respect to the validity of chattel mortgages in pursuance of the lending pro-
gram...." 276 F.2d at 738.
' For a discussion of the Texas policy on married women's contracts see Red River
Nat'l Bank v. Ferguson, 109 Tex. 287, 206 S.W. 923 (1918). The court stated, "the
steady unbroken policy of the laws of Texas has been to protect the property of the
wife from the debts of the husband." Id. at 924. The court explained, "if (the wife's]
powers have been restricted, her property, at least, has been safeguarded. The limita-
tions upon her authority are but the expression of a scrupulous concern for the
preservation of her estate, and were imposed to that end. In that interest her
authority to contract debts at all was confined to those essentially to her advantage,
that is, for necessaries for herself or her children and the benefit of her estate... ."
Id. at 925. See Tolbert v. Standard Ace. Ins. Co., 148 Tex. 285, 228 S.W.2d 617 (1949).
46 See note 40 supra.
17 For the various sources utilized see notes 28-26 supra.
8 See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 19 REcoRD
OF N.Y.C.BA. 64 (1964), suggesting that such adoption might meet the desire for
uniformity. However, Judge Friendly states that it would be difficult to determine the
scope of the enactment: "Should such a federal rule apply only to transactions where
the papers or the goods they represent cross state lines? Should it exhaust the com-
merce power by one of the traditional wordings or adopt the suggested form ot
covering 'every case where there is some basis for applying the law of more than one
state?' Should it go even further and also include all commercial contracts with the
federal government, all such contracts sought to be enforced in admiralty, even all
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states which have already adopted the Code,49 the prospective bor-
rower would not be faced with a different rule when dealing with
federal agencies. But until the Code is adopted by legislative enact-
ment or judicial decree, the local activities of such federal agencies
as the SBA tend to justify choice of law decisions incorporating state
law whenever possible.
such contracts passing through the mail. Or should Congress take the bolder step of
declaring that in order to make its rule truly workable in these large areas of its
enumerated powers, the small remaining enclaves must also be occupied." Id. at 90-91.
,9 The Code has been adopted in 30 jurisdictions. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODF,
UNIF. LAWS ANN. 5 (Supp. 1964).
